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Aethiopica 5 (2002) 
The Impact of Dogali on the International Policy  
of the Central European Powers 
BAIRU TAFLA 
The centennial celebration of the victory of Dogali in Ethiopia in February 
1987 revived the history and memory of a battle which had somehow slipped 
into oblivion as quickly as it was fought. In contrast to the first hundred years 
in which historians dismissed the event with a couple of sentences, the name 
ߋDogaliߌ was widely reported in the European press in 1887, but it soon 
submerged under the generic names of ߋMassawaߌ and ߋItalian Colonial Pos-
sessions at the Red Sea Coastߌ in the archives of at least the Central European 
states. In the published records, too, it was tragically misrepresented as a mas-
sacre, an ambush and an illegitimate unilateral attack by ߋa rebel chiefߌ. 
Unlike ʞAdwa and May Ãw, there was, at least to my knowledge, no insti-
tution, no square and no street in Ethiopia named after this victory until the 
last quarter of the 20th century. Admittedly, the battle was too small and too 
fleeting in relation to the magnitude of the colonial confrontations of the time. 
But it was no doubt symbolically historic so as not to be forgotten by at least 
the victor. ߋThe battle of Dogaliߌ, acknowledges a historian of our time, ߋwas 
undoubtedly one of the most important events in the history of Ethiopia in 
the late 19th centuryߌ.1 ߋDogali wasߌ, states another, ߋthe bitter pill which the 
European colonial powers in general and Italy in particular had to swallowߌ.2 
The second century of Dogali began not only with a special monograph3 
comprising a number of academic essays which assess various aspects of the 
battle, but also with an historical novel in Amharic.4 The celebration also 
 
1 HAGGAI ERLICH, Ethiopia and Eritrea During the Scramble for Africa: a Political 
Biography of Ras Alula, 1875߃1897 (East Lansing, Mich. 1982) p. 106. 
2 DANIEL GHEBREKIDAN, ߋDogali and Ethiopia߈s Continuing Struggle on the Red Sea 
Coastߌ in: TADDESSE BEYENE, TADDESSE TAMRAT and RICHARD PANKHURST (eds.), 
The Centenary of Dogali. Proceedings of the International Symposium, Addis Aba-
ba-Asmara, January 24߃25, 1987 (Addis AbÃba 1988) p. 30. This monograph is re-
ferred to here and after as TTPDogali. 
3 See footnote 2 above. 
4 MAMMO WEDDEN£H, Alula abba nÃgga ߃ tarik qÃmmÃs leb wÃllÃd [= ߑ: An Histori-
cal Novel] (Addis AbÃba 1979 of the Year of Grace = 1986/87]. The same author, who 
was a government official in Eritrea for many years, also wrote a couple of other works 
more or less related to Dogali: ߋThe Life and Works of Alula Abba Negaߌ in: TTPDo-
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gave impetus to further study of the history of the battle and its actors in 
the subsequent a dozen or so years.5 A printing press has been named after 
the battle. Even a ߋwargameߌ has been devised and a homepage devoted to 
it,6 both in memory of Dogali. The celebration was not restricted to scholars 
and writers. It was a national jubilation in which the head of state and high 
party members of the socialist government were personally involved. 
The Dogali centennial was no doubt the first victory to be celebrated na-
tionwide. This sudden fascination with and awakening of an almost forgot-
ten victory begs the question for the underlying motive or cause. Dogali 
was by no means the first Ethiopian victory over external encroachers. 
Nonetheless, the centennials of Gundat and Gura߈e passed unnoticed in 
1975 and 1976 respectively. No one seems in fact to have thought about the 
fourth centennial of Debarwa in 1978.7 Dogali was by no means greater than 
any of those successes either. 
From the cultural point of view, in fact, centennial celebration is a recent 
innovation in Ethiopia. Even annual celebrations of secular events were not 
common in the country prior to the 20th century. At least the historical re-
cords do not bear witness to such a practice.8 
It all began with Emperor Menilek߈s parade commemorating the seventh 
anniversary of his victory over the Italians at ʞAdwa. Emperor HaylÃ Sellase 
took it over as a national holiday and it has since then been celebrated on 
the second of March every year. Its pompous centennial took place in Addis 
AbÃba and ʞAdwa in 1996. YÃkkatit 12 (usually known as the Graziani Mas-
 
gali, pp. 231߃52; Yohannes. BÃtarik lay yÃtÃmÃsÃrrÃtÃ lebwÃllÃd [= ߑ: A Novel Based 
on History] (Addis AbÃba, Genbot 1985 Year of Grace = May߃June 1993) 340 pages. 
5 The late Ethiopian historian, TÃklÃ Sadeq MÃkweriya, for instance, revised his earlier 
account of the colonial adventures of Italy in the late 19th century and made Dogali the 
hub of his narrative. Cf. T£KL£ SADEQ M£KWERIYA, Ase Yohannes enna Ityopeya 
AndennÃt [= ߋEmperor Yohannes and the Unity of Ethiopiaߌ] (Addis AbÃba 1983 of 
the Year of Grace = 1990߃91) pp. 321߃445. 
6 Ruggero Romano߈s Homepage is allegedly prepared by Andrew Preziosi and Andrea 
Zanini (whose connection with Northeast Africa is unknown to me) under the title 
ߋL߈Artigliere Stancoߌ. It deals with the historical background, the battle order, the 
course of the battle, the uniform of the soldiers, and finally they make a war game out 
of the story. See http://www.geocities.com/TimesSquare/Zone/3323/dogali.htm. 
7 The explanation that the country was at the verge of a civil war in the late 1970߈s does 
not justify the scholars߈ failure to hold symposia. 
8 The tradition has been that an annual feast-day was set for each saint (but celebrated 
monthly since the mid-15th century) while a deceased relation would be commemorat-
ed on the 3rd , 7th, 12th and 40th day as well as on the 6th month, 1st and 7th year. There 
have also been some regional variations. 
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sacre) has also been celebrated annually on the 20th/21st of February. The 
Liberation Day9 (May 5) forms the third national secular holiday. 
Since the mid-1970s, Dogali had been popularised by emanent scholars of 
history as an essential component of colonial history.10 Nonetheless, there has 
been no hint for the connexion between these studies and the celebration of 
1987. The most plausible explanation for the centennial of Dogali is perhaps 
to be found in the regime߈s need to arouse the esprit de corps of the society. 
Disappointed by the revolution߈s ill success in almost every field, distressed 
by the harrowing famine that revisited several regions in the mid-1980s and 
dismayed more than anything else by the ever increasing war in Eritrea and 
Tegray, the morale of the people, and particularly that of the army, dwindled 
continuously. The DÃrg badly needed the morale and psychological en-
hancement of the people. Ideological propaganda alone proved to be of little 
help. History was, therefore, called upon to boost the required morale and to 
arouse patriotism. This was clear from the speech of President MÃngestu 
HaylÃ Maryam and his comrades.11 The editors of the proceedings of the 
centennial conference ߃ three outstanding scholars of Ethiopian studies ߃ also 
expressed their hope (perhaps not without irony) that the celebration would 
tickle the country߈s patriotism which appeared to be at rest: 
ߋThe centenary anniversary celebration of the victory of Dogali was ob-
served from January 24߃25, 1987 all over the country through several events 
and observances. ߑ It can, therefore, be assumed that the message of Dogali 
has been able to reach millions of compatriots and thus enrich their appre-
ciation of our proud history which is replete with instances of sacrifice and 
further inculcate a sense of patriotism and strengthen the feeling of Ethiopi-
anness. ߑ It is hoped that this series of papers may serve to illuminate a cru-
cially important period of Ethiopian history, and that the record of the 
struggle of a century ago may serve as an inspiration for our own dayߌ.12 
Evaluating the successes and failures of Dogali as a political instrument in 
the 20th century lies beyond the scope of this article which aims at assessing 
a particular aspect of the battle. The participants of the 1987 symposium 
 
 9 The DÃrg moved this date to MÃggabit 28 (= 4/5 April) with the argument that the 
resistance fighters and allied troops had reached the capital by that date, i.e. a month 
earlier than the Emperor. The succeeding government restored it to May 5 after 1991. 
10 Three of the major studies are: ZEWDE GABRE-SELLASSIE, Yohannes IV of Ethiopia: a 
Political Biography (Oxford 1975); SVEN RUBENSON, The Survival of Ethiopian Inde-
pendence (London 1976); and, HAGGAI ERLICH, Ethiopia and Eritrea during the Scram-
ble for Africa: a Political Biography of Ras Alula, 1875߃1897 (East Lansing, Mich. 1982). 
11 TTPDogali pp. 11߃25. 
12 TTPDogali pp. 5߃7. 
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discussed the events that led to the conflict, the states and personalities that 
played crucial roles, and the historical context within which Dogali could be 
viewed. The repercussion of the battle far beyond the conspicuous players, 
venue and acts seems, however, to have been overlooked. The present paper 
attempts to supplement the multifaceted study by reflecting on the seeming-
ly remote, and yet significant, consequences of the victory.13 
The main colonial contestants in Northeast Africa at this time were 
France, Great Britain and Italy. One may, therefore, wonder what the Cen-
tral European Powers had to do with Dogali. The British Labour writer, 
Leonard Woolf, gives us the clue: 
ߋWhen Lord Napier sailed away from Annesley Bay, having won a peer-
age and a pension, Abyssinia was left to the Abyssinians. ߑ Within 
twenty years Abyssinia again entered the orbit of European policy.ߌ14 
Once in this ߋorbitߌ, Ethiopia could not but interest more powers than the 
triads. The come-back was initiated by Dogali, a name which suddenly ap-
peared in the papers published between Rome and Stockholm, and between 
St. Petersburg and London. It was the concern of not only France, Great 
Britain and Italy, but also of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Rus-
sia. By ߋCentral European Powersߌ I am, however, referring mainly to the 
German Empire and the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, both of which were 
so significant in international relations that they had to be reckoned with in 
almost every major development. 
The international policies of the individual European states were, and still 
are, so intricately interwoven with the policies and interests of others that 
no historian can ignore the policies of the other states when considering that 
of a particular one. 
In a way, colonialism was also a concerted effort of most of the European 
governments who met in Berlin in 1884߃85 to lay down the principles of 
their proceeding with their ߋcivilising missionߌ. Articles 34 and 35 of the 
General Act of the Conference endorsed that a power that gained a foot-
hold at the African coast had also the right to exert its power and impose its 
sovereignty over the interior as far as the boundaries of the possessions of 
another European power.15 This means that on the one hand Italy, which 
 
13 The tenor of this article was given in a speech in a seminar entitled ߋThe Battle of Dogali 
߃ The First Centennial Celebrationߌ held at the Africa Centre, London, on 24 January 
1987 under the auspices of the Ethiopian Community in Great Britain. In a way, there-
fore, it falls in the same category as the other contributions published in TTPDogali. 
14 LEONARD WOOLF, Empire and Commerce in Africa (London c. 1920) p. 151. 
15 For the articles of the treaty, see EDWARD HERTSLET (ed.), The Map of Africa by 
Treaty. Third edition, I߃III (London 1909; repr. 1967), II pp. 484f. 
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had gained foothold at the Red Sea coast during the conference session, had 
the blessing of the other powers to proceed into the interior, while on the 
other hand the independent Christian state of Ethiopia with which several of 
the European states had diplomatic contacts was totally ignored as a sovereign 
state. None seemed to have thought about the possibility that the expanding 
power could face a stiff and legitimate resistance. The racial factor was too 
strong for the development of a different attitude. It was also not at all clear 
whether they would come to the aid of that particular power if the resis-
tance was too great. Perhaps such a consideration was superfluous in as 
much as complex alliance arrangements already existed. An important his-
torical significance of Dogali in this context was that it worked as an effec-
tive test for the feasibility and durability of this fabric worked out on paper. 
On the emotional level, Dogali drummed up all the European sympathies 
for Italy. After all, Dogali was an insult to the civilising powers and a bad 
omen for colonial projects. Rubenson remarks that Dogali ߋߑ was a far 
stronger protest than the Italians or British had expectedߌ.16 True enough, 
but I would go further to say that it was more than all colonial powers and, 
in fact, all those who believed in the superiority of a particular race had 
expected. Was it not a common dictum of the contemporary European 
press that no one on earth could resist the sword of European civilisation? 
What they feared and what they hated to hear ߃ namely, self-confidence 
of the Africans ߃ made itself soon noticeable as a natural consequence of 
Dogali. Menilek II used the horrors of that battle as a bugbear against in-
truders. He wrote in 1892 that, ߋߑ the Italians would ߇be punished in the 
same way as their brothers at Dogali߈ߌ,17 if they continued to meddle in the 
affairs of his Empire. This was not a mere menace. He translated it into ac-
tion at ʞAdwa only four years later. 
The repercussions of Dogali in Italy itself were startling, as a specialist on 
the period recapitulates it: 
ߋDogali seriously damaged the prestige of the Italian army and caused 
great sadness and vengeful emotions in the mother country. The defeat 
was followed by a governmental crisis and changes in leadership at Mas-
sawa. Parliament voted finance for a large scale-punitive expedition, and 
war in the near future seemed to be inevitable.ߌ18 
Dogali also disturbed the French and the British who were paradoxically 
involved in the rivalry as well as in the intermediary. But all their diplomatic 
 
16 RUBENSON, 1976, p. 381. 
17 RUBENSON, 1976, p. 396. 
18 ERLICH, 1982, p. 111. 
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attempts to create a harmless image of Italy at the court of Yohannes IV were 
frustrated by the Sovereign߈s unwavering decision to stand by his general. 
The Germans and the Austro-Hungarians watched the developments  
rather indifferently on the surface; but in actual fact they were somewhat 
worried, for they sensed that Dogali was likely to interfere with their 
5-year-old pact with Italy. Ethiopia as such was of little interest to them, 
and it was only about a dozen years earlier that they ignored Yohannes߈ 
appeal against Egypt. This time, the Sovereign ignored them and did not 
even try to communicate to them a justification for the action of his general, 
let alone appeal to them for help. Italy was their ally, but none of them was 
prepared to help in the field, though both were interested in retaining a 
Mediterranean state as their friend. 
As the Ethiopian resistance became too strong, Italy began to wonder 
whether the alliance could be of any use to her in this particular struggle. Ap-
parently, the Italian question had a double purpose: firstly, to test whether 
and how the treaty could be implemented; Italy had had her doubts about 
this treaty since her occupation of Massawa in 1885. Secondly, she wanted 
to assess the seriousness of German colonial intentions in Northeast Africa. 
To take the less important point first, quite a few people in Germany, and 
to some extent in Austria, entertained for a considerable time the idea of  
colonizing Ethiopia or at least some parts of it. As early as the 1830߈s, a num-
ber of German and Austrian travellers visited the country and recommended 
in their books and articles that Ethiopia should be conquered for a colony. 
The German nobleman von Katte wrote in 1836߃38 that Tegray and other 
parts of northern Ethiopia could have been rather favourable for German 
plantation projects which could be acquired either through purchase or con-
quest; and in the case of the latter, he visualized Massawa as a spring-board.19 
Some years later, an Austrian nobleman, Eduard von Callot, who had once 
been to GondÃr on a secret mission on behalf of Muhammad Ali of Egypt, 
expressed his desire for a conquest. ߋGive me ten thousand men utmostߌ, he 
wrote, ߋand I will undertake the responsibility to conquer Abyssinia for  
Austria and to introduce an administration which, though it has to be 
semi-military, will indeed make the country flourish and enhance its pros-
perity in a short time.ߌ20 The political dissensions of the ZÃmÃnÃ MÃsafent 
and the incessant civil war might have given them an impression of the 
country߈s weakness, but the possibility that the notables might unite against 
 
19 A. VON KATTE, Reise in Abyssinien (Stuttgart 1838) p. 146f. 
20 EDUARD FRHR. VON CALLOT, Der Orient und Europa. Erinnerungen und Reisebilder 
von Land und Meer I߃X (Leipzig 1854) II pp. 296f. See also MICHAEL ZACH, µster-
reicher im Sudan 1820 bis 1914 = BeitrÃge zur Afrikanistik 24 (Vienna 1985) p. 63. 
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an external invasion such as that visualized by Callot does not seem to have 
occurred to anyone. Such was the attitude of the time toward Ethiopia. 
Fortunately, nobody attempted to entrust such a responsibility to Callot 
as on the one hand Austria was keenly interested in trade with Ethiopia and 
was about this time trying to conclude a treaty of commerce and friendship 
rather than to attempt to win more nationalities under her rule than those 
she already had, and on the other hand Callot was a revolutionary who was 
active in the uprisings of 1848 for which he was sentenced to a 7-year im-
prisonment. A scholar at the University of Vienna has forwarded a thesis 
that Callot fell out of favour for, among other reasons, proposing the con-
quest of Ethiopia and he supports his argument with the fact that Callot߈s 
10-volume work entitled ߋEurope and the Orientߌ was banned from Aus-
tria and that even today no official library possesses a copy.21 I, for one, 
cannot subscribe to this view until further corroboration is made. 
The fact is, however, that Austria showed a special interest in the Nile 
valley where numerous of her subjects were engaged as missionaries, busi-
nessmen and diplomats,22 as well as in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean coasts 
of Africa where she intended to establish a colony of deportees. In 1857 a 
senior officer, Wilhelm von Tegethoff, was sent to survey the area for the 
purpose. He considered Massawa and other places before he finally recom-
mended the island of Socotra.23 This was probably the last Austrian attempt 
in this respect. 
It was different on the German side. So long as Otto FÛrst von Bismarck 
(1815߃98) dominated the German politics, the difference between the wish 
of the people inspired by the philosophy of the age and the foreign policy of 
the government dictated by ߋRealpolitikߌ, as it was known, was very con-
spicuous. In principle, von Bismarck was not in favour of emigration or the 
acquisition of colonies abroad. Hence, the colonization of Togo, Namibia 
and Tanganyika was nothing else but the feat of the businessmen of Ham-
burg and Bremen. Von Bismarck accepted in 1884 what were to be known 
as the German colonies in Africa mainly for reasons of political expediency 
at home. Even then, the so-called burden of financing the colonies had to be 
borne by the businessmen. 
 
21 ZACH, 1985, p. 63. See also his article: ߋEduard Freiherr von Callots Beschreibung von 
Gondarߌ. In: Wiener Ethnohistorische BlÃtter 30 (Vienna 1986) pp. 51߃66. 
22 E. TONIOLO and R. HILL, The Opening of the Nile Basin. Writings by Members of the 
Catholic Mission to Central Africa on the Geography of the Sudan 1842߃1881 (Lon-
don 1974) pp. 49߃320. 
23 ZACH, 1985, pp. 140߃45. 
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Nonetheless, there was a continuous agitation, especially from academi-
cians and business people, to raise the German economy to the standard of 
the British one by colonizing Ethiopia. As Ethiopia successfully demon-
strated her capability to defend her independence by crushing a series of 
Egyptian encroachments organized by Swiss, Austro-Hungarian, Danish and 
American adventurers, the colonial target changed from Christian highland 
Ethiopia to the so-called ߋno man߈s landߌ; namely, the Barka basin, the Red 
Sea coast and Harar, all of which were also coveted by Italy. Johann Hilde-
brandt explored these areas in 1872߃73;24 and, the staunch propagator of colo-
nialism, Baron von MÛller, surveyed25 them again in 1880߃81 and recom-
mended the conquest of these ߋherrenlose LÃnderߌ [= ߋownerless coun-
triesߌ] in his own words. The half German and half Czech explorer, Anton 
Stecker, also toured and mapped the highlands in the years 1881߃83 on be-
half of the German African Geographical Society,26 quite a few of whose 
members were enthusiastic proponents of colonialism. As Dr. Zewde points 
out in his book on the period, two German explorers toured Harar in the 
mid-1880߈s, and it was rumoured that German colonial intentions were 
about to be realized.27 The Italian Government had, therefore, reason to be 
somewhat suspicious of the sincerity of their ally when the German gov-
ernment failed to show enthusiasm for the Italian enterprise in the area. 
Von Bismarck߈s aversion to colonial acquisition in Africa actually re-
mained unaffected by the campaigns of his compatriots. On the contrary, 
he was desirous to see Russian involvement in Northeast Africa,28 as well as 
France being bogged in war with any power in that region. The German 
and Austro-Hungarian Governments were unhappy with the Italian activi-
ties in the Red Sea area for quite a different reason. They were of the opin-
ion that Italy߈s impolitic move in Northeast Africa was by no means con-
 
24 JOHANN MARIA HILDEBRANDT, ߋAusflug in die Nord-Abessinischen GrenzlÃnder im 
Sommer 1872ߌ in: Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft fÛr Erdkunde zu Berlin 8 (1873) pp. 
449߃71; and, ߋErlebnisse auf einer Reise von Massua in das Gebiet der Afer und nach 
Adenߌ in: Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft fÛr Erdkunde zu Berlin 10 (1875) pp. 1߃37. 
25 JOHANN FRHR.V. M»LLER, ߋTagebuch meiner Reise durch das Gebiet der Habab und 
Beni-Amerߌ in: Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft fÛr Erdkunde zu Berlin 18 (1883) pp. 412߃38; 
ߋDie HandelsverhÃltnisse der Somali und Galla Gebieteߌ in: KÕlnische Zeitung (KÕln 13. 
Juli 1883); and, ߋTagebuch einer Reise durch das Gebiet der Gadabursi-Somali und  
Noli-Galla nach Harrarߌ in: Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft fÛr Erdkunde zu Berlin 19 
(1884) pp. 104߃22. 
26 G.E. FRITZSCHE, ߋDr. Anton Steckers Reisen in den Galla-LÃndern, 1882. Nach seinen 
Tagebuchnotizenߌ in: Petermanns Geographische Mittheilungen 37 (1891) pp. 233߃41. 
 ZEWDE, 1975, p. 210. See also H. SCHWARZ, Die Entwicklung der vÕlkerrechtlichen 
Beziehungen £thiopiens zu den MÃchten seit 1885 (Breslau 1947) pp. 14, 17, 24. 
28 ZEWDE, 1975, p. 221. 
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current with the spirit of their treaty of alliance. Germany, Aus-
tria-Hungary and Italy signed a secret treaty of alliance in May 1882 which 
was to be valid for five years. With the exception of a few uncautious re-
marks of some Italian parliamentarians and the Italian press against Austria, 
there appeared no sign of discord among the three states before 1885. Prib-
ram, who analysed the treaty writes that: ߋߑ chief Italian statesmen kept 
referring most cordially to the Triple Alliance and its beneficial results for 
Italy, and promised it their unswerving allegiance.ߌ He adds: 
ߋIt was the colonial plans of Italy, developed in 1885 in emulation of the 
Western powers, which first caused serious concern to the two Empires. 
The military occupation of the Egyptian port of Massowah on the Red 
Sea, without previous notification to Vienna or Berlin, seemed to the 
statesmen of Germany and Austria-Hungary not altogether in accord 
with the provisions of the treaty of the Triple Alliance.ߌ29 
In May 1885, the Austrian Foreign Minister, Graf GustÀv KÀlnoky (1832߃
98), consulted von Bismarck whether they should draw Italy߈s attention to 
this matter. Von Bismarck strongly condemned Italy߈s action, but he insist-
ed that she should be given ߋߑ time to reformߌ herself. Obviously, Graf 
KÀlnoky and von Bismarck had lost confidence in Italian policy at this time. 
A few months later, both remarked in a joint interview that Italy ߋߑ could 
not be regarded as a significant factor in any possible combinationߌ.30 Von 
Bismarck warned his Austrian colleague to watch the Italian move carefully 
and added, ߋWe must see to it that there is no chance of Italy through her 
pranks involving us ߃ perhaps deliberately ߃ in a conflict with Franceߌ.31 
Graf KÀlnoky then informed his ambassador in Rome: 
ߋIn view of developments in the East while the negotiations were in pro-
gress, it would have been impossible for us to assume obligations which 
might have drawn us into war with France. This would have run counter 
to our interests, without being of any real profit to Italy.ߌ32 
France had, of course, not only an established colony at Djibouti, right in the 
neighbourhood of the territories claimed by Italy, but also entertained a polit-
ical scheme over Ethiopia and far beyond it, a scheme which later reached a  
 
 
29 A.F. PRIBRAM, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary 1879߃1914. I: Texts of the 
Treaties and Agreements. II: Negotiations Leading to the Treaties of the Triple Alli-
ance (New York 1967) II, p. 45. 
30 PRIBRAM, 1967, II: p. 45. 
31 PRIBRAM, 1967, II, p. 46. 
32 PRIBRAM, 1967, II, p. 73. 
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climax in the so-called Fashoda Incident. It seemed, therefore, likely that 
sooner or later a conflict would flare up between Italy and France in North-
east as well as in North Africa. 
The negotiation referred to in the letter pertained to the renewal of the 
treaty. Von Bismarck was always apprehensive of France and Russia though 
he declared loudly that he feared none but God and he ingeniously devised 
a series of treaties, among which was that of the Triple Alliance, to isolate 
France and to deter Russian expansion to the Balkans. The Aus-
tro-Hungarian Empire was equally interested in the treaty particularly as a 
security measure against Russian expansion into her Slavic territories. Both 
were profoundly interested in the prolongation of the treaty. Italy joined 
them in 1882, having been frustrated by France in her colonial attempts in 
North Africa; but as Germany and Austria-Hungary were now reluctant to 
help her in her Ethiopian enterprise, Italy threatened to withdraw her 
membership. The Italian Foreign Minister, Conte Carlo Felice di Robilant 
(1826߃88), wrote to Austria in mid-1886:  
ߋItaly is tired of this unprofitable alliance, and I feel no desire to facilitate 
its renewal; for I am convinced that it will always remain unprofitable for 
us. It is possible, however, that Herr von Bismarck is deceived with re-
gard to me, and has imagined, in his ignorance, that I will feel constrained 
to follow him at all times and under all circumstances. If he believes this, 
he is grievously mistaken. It is more than probable that I shall not renew 
the alliance. I shall wait, however, for the proper moment to come before 
committing myself. I therefore desire that you, for your part, should 
avoid any exchange of opinion in the matter of the renewal of the alli-
ance. If the Imperial Chancellor wishes to set on foot negotiations to this 
end, he must take the initiative and let us know his ideas.ߌ33 
Before long, however, Italy realized that by quitting the Triple Alliance, she 
would gain nothing: no tangible help would come from Great Britain; Fran-
ce was a ruthless rival who would exclude Italy from all possible areas; Rus-
sia was showing interest in Ethiopia, and in fact it was rumoured, at least 
according to the German press, that France and Russia were co-operating 
with Ethiopia against Italy; and last but not least, there was no prospect for 
Italy of getting a share in the event the territories of the so-called ߋsick man 
of Europeߌ were to be divided among the powers. So she opted for the re-
newal.  
But shortly before the treaty was signed on 20 February 1887, there oc-
curred the shocking disaster of Dogali which forced Italy to repeat her 
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question for the last time whether article IV of the treaty could not be im-
plemented in her favour. The article read:  
ߋIn case a Great Power nonsignatory to the present Treaty should 
threaten the security of the states of one of the High Contracting Parties, 
and the threatened Party should find itself forced on that account to 
make war against it, the two others bind themselves to observe towards 
their Ally a benevolent neutrality. Each of them reserves to itself, in this 
case, the right to take part in the war, if it should see fit, to make com-
mon cause with its Ally.ߌ34 
That the two allies remained neutral in accordance with the agreement was 
not doubted by Italy; but she hoped that either of them would ߋsee it fitߌ to 
come to her aid, or at least that both would exert diplomatic pressure upon 
France so as to neutralize or minimize opposition from that nation. 
Von Bismarck߈s reply was brief and clear. As far as he was concerned, the 
article was intended against Russia and could by no means be applied to 
Africa. Austria-Hungary also accepted the same interpretation. Italy on her 
part threatened that she would not help on the event of a war between  
Austria-Hungary and Russia. To appease Italy, however, von Bismarck and 
Graf KÀlnoky signed on the same day separate additional treaties with Italy 
promising the maintenance of status quo in the Orient except for the ques-
tion of Egypt. On the surface, this meant that the territories of the Ottoman 
Empire would be preserved intact and, hence, Italy would be free to use all 
her power in the Red Sea area. But in actual fact, ߋOrientߌ was a vague term 
which was not defined in the treaty until 1891 when the treaty had to be 
prolonged again. To the disappointment of Italy, the other two signatories 
understood under this term only the Balkans and, hence, North Africa was 
left open to rivalry. The two allies nonetheless continued to offer Italy more 
or less symbolic assistance as means of appeasement: both promised to assist 
her against French attacks in North, if not in Northeast, Africa. They re-
duced in their protocols the status of the Ethiopian sovereign first to ߋHis 
Highnessߌ and then to ߋThe Abyssinian Chiefߌ; they recognized without 
any reservation her protectorate over Awsa, her protectorate over Ethiopia 
as assumed under the treaty of W ale, and her declaration of the colony of 
Eritrea; and, they worked out a formula in collaboration with Lord Salis-
bury which would enable Italy to represent Ethiopia in the Anti-Slavery 
Conference at Brussels. In fact, von Bismarck߈s successor, Graf Georg Leo 
von Caprivi (1831߃99), was explicitly in favour of the Italian scheme in 
Ethiopia, his only worry in this connexion being that Italy might incite 
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Great Britain into a conflict by intervening in the Sudan. The two powers 
even banned the export of weapons to Ethiopia in accordance with an Ital-
ian request shortly before the Campaign of ʞAdwa. 
But Italy could by no means be satisfied with a mere diplomatic support 
of her allies which was not effective enough to deter French intrigues 
against her colonial attempts in Northeast Africa and was looking for an 
opportunity to befriend England and to patch her differences with France. 
After her defeat at ʞAdwa in 1896, she directed her covetise toward Tyrol 
and the Balkans where she continued to agitate:  
ߋThe failure in Ethiopia (1896) of Italy߈s first foray into overseas coloni-
alism led to a revival of its patriots߈ covetousness of Austro-Hungarian 
territory, and the Triple Alliance became less and less attractive to Italy߈s 
public opinion as the motives both for peaceful coexistence with Aus-
tria-Hungary and for anti-French alliance with Germany were invalidat-
ed.ߌ35 
At the same time, she made overtures to her archenemy, France, with whom 
she reached an understanding in 1900; and two years later they signed a 
treaty of friendship. Although the Triple Alliance treaty was renewed in 
1902, 1907 and 1912 with Italy still as a member, as far as that country was 
concerned it was a scrap of paper. 
As far as Germany and Austria-Hungary were concerned, Italy after 
1896 was nothing more than a shadow ally on whom they could not rely. 
Once again they were shocked to hear that Italy was going to try her luck in 
Ethiopia, and they hastened to dissociate themselves from the ominous 
venture. Only two weeks before the Battle of ʞAdwa, the German Imperial 
Chancellor, Prince Chlodwig von Hohenlohe-SchillingsfÛrst (1819߃1901) 
stated: 
ߋߑ a naval war between Italy, Russia and France on account of Abys-
sinia would not constitute casus foederis for the Triple Allianceߌ.36 
Both recognized Ethiopia as an independent sovereign state and signed 
treaties of friendship and commerce with a ߋmost favoured nationߌ clause in 
1905.37 They lifted the ban of firearm export to Ethiopia in 1907 and tried 
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their best through trade and diplomacy to overtake Italian influence in 
Ethiopia. The rivalry came to a climax when Austria-Hungary sold cannons 
to Ethiopia in 1913߃14, and a row broke out in the Italian Parliament on the 
allegation that the Austro-Hungarian Honorary Consul, Schwimmer, 
warned the Ethiopian Government of Italian plans to invade Ethiopia from 
the north. Italy did not deny her military build-up in Eritrea, but argued 
that it was meant for the defence of her colony against Ethiopian aggression. 
At long last, Italy left the Central Alliance and joined the Entente powers 
in May 1915 against Germany and Austria-Hungary, because the new allies 
promised her what her old allies did not; namely, to give her a part of  
Ethiopia if they won the war. They did win the war, but they had no por-
tion of Ethiopia to dispose of to Italy. In spite of Dogali and ʞAdwa, Italy 
ventured once again to conquer Ethiopia in 1935, but this time with ex-
traordinarily massive preparations. 
By way of concluding this brief dimensional assessment, let me assert 
that the Battle of Dogali was in essence the first open challenge to European 
colonialism in Northeast Africa. Its impact in history was twofold: on the 
international level, it cracked the Triple Alliance which ʞAdwa, the histori-
cal culmination of Dogali, subsequently rendered ineffective for good. On 
the national or regional level, Dogali initiated a campaign for liberty and 
sovereignty which was to last for decades and in which ʞAdwa and May Ãw 
were to stand as landmarks. These landmarks were nonetheless fought deep 
in the heart of the country, and in this respect Dogali, which took place way 
out of the effective control of the Empire, is no doubt exemplary. 
Summary 
The victory of Dogali (1887) represents the first successful resistance to European colo-
nialism in Northeast Africa, and as such its historical significance has been immense. For 
some obscure reason, however, it was neglected in Ethiopian historiography until the 
last quarter of the 20th century when it was popularized for academic and political pur-
poses. Its impact in history was twofold: on the international level, it cracked the Triple 
Alliance which ʞAdwa, the historical culmination of Dogali, subsequently rendered 
ineffective for good. On the national or regional level, Dogali initiated a campaign for 
liberty and sovereignty which was to last for decades and in which ʞAdwa and May Ãw 
were to stand as landmarks. These landmarks were nonetheless fought deep in the heart 
of the country, and in this respect Dogali, which took place way out of the effective 
control of the Empire, is no doubt exemplary. 
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